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Angino: Limitation of Liability
in Admiralty: An Anachronism from the Day
SUMMER 1965]

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY IN ADMIRALTY: AN
ANACHRONISM FROM THE DAYS OF PRIVITY

SCOPE AND DIRECTION

Admiralty lawyers are currently expressing grave concern over some
"extraordinary" cases recently decided in the federal courts. Among
1
these, Murray v. New York Central R.R. is probably having the greatest

impact. Therein it was held that maintenance and cure "is sufficiently
contractual to put it in the contract category and thus place it outside the
3
compass of limitation."'2 In view of the prior personal contract history,
this ruling is a radical change - one more indicative of legislative fiat
than judicial decree. Other judges, instead of dismissing or sidestepping
the holding as the act of an over-zealous advocate of limitation abolition,
have affirmed the holding4 and now threaten to spread it into other
circuits. 5 The effect of such action would result in a devastating escalation

of recoverable damages following a collision or accident, sometimes
doubling the shipowner's total liability.
The Murray case, the recent trend of judicial decisions, and the
comments expressed therein are indicative of the fact that the courts
are completely dissatisfied with the limitation feature of admiralty law.
The courts' present attitude is one of growing impatience with the legislature's failure to overrule the Limitations Act of 1854, especially in its
application to personal injuries. 6 The inability of a passenger or seaman
adequately to protect himself against a collision and the subsequent
1. 171 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 287 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1961).
2. Murray v. New York Central R.R., 171 F. Supp. 80, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
3. 3 BgNEDICr, ADMnAirY 371 (6th ed. 1940) ; GmuMoaE & BLACK, THE LAW OV
ADmnIALTY 706 (1957); Castles, The Personal Contract Doctrine: An Anomaly in
American Maritime Law, 62 YALE L.J. 1031 (1953).
4. 287 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1961).
5. Subsequent to the preparation of this comment, the threat became a reality.
The District Court of Delaware has gone beyond Murray and declared that maintenance and cure does not even come within the ambit of the Limitation of Liability Act.
Needless to say, the duty [maintenance and cure] is a unique one and quite
different from the duty to make reparation for personal injuries. Congress cannot be presumed to have created the possibility that this duty can be wiped out.
If maintenance and cure is subject to limitation, a seaman's protection under the
ancient right might be seriously diminished in some circumstances. Therefore,
despite the broad language of the Limitation of Liability Statute, 46 U.S.C. § 183,
I hold upon principle, that such liability is not one which is extinguished by the
granting of a petition to limit liability. . . . This was also the result reached by
Judge Murphy in Murray v. New York Central R.R. Co., a decision squarely on
point which, in the absence of authority to the contrary, I shall follow. Petition
of Oscar Tiedemann & Co., 236 F. Supp. 895, 912 (D. Del. 1964).
6. In re United States Dredging Corp., 264 F.2d 339, 341 (2d Cir. 1959), the
court stated:
However, it is at least doubtful whether the motives that originally lay behind
the limitation are not now obsolete; and certainly we should now have no warrant
for extending its scope, when the liability is for personal injury arising from
the shipowner's fault.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965

1

VillanovaVILLANOVA
Law Review, Vol.LAW
10, Iss. 4REVIEW
[1965], Art. 13

[VOL. 10

possibility of limitation of his recoverable damages has impressed the
courts as patently unjust. A large cargo owner can protect himself
through insurance and pass the premium cost along to the consumer. Shipowners can likewise insure and limit. However, the seaman or passenger
must content himself with his proportionate share of the limitation fund
though it may not ever approximate his injuries. The judiciary has
demonstrated its unwillingness to continue this injustice and the present
bent of the courts to judicially engraft severe limitations on the application of the Act may make Congressional repeal of the act unnecessary.
History indicates that the same economic policy which gave rise to
the privity doctrine in the products liability area 7 also gave birth to the
Limitations Act. Also, the same paternal desire to protect the previously
unprotected individual, which assailed and overcame the doctrine of
privity, now threatens to undermine the Limitations Act. Both doctrines
were born during the infancy of the Industrial Revolution of a desire
to shield the small manufacturer and shipowner. Their most extensive
interpretations appeared at a time when mining, manufacturing, and
shipping began to compete favorably with that of England, France and
Germany; severe restrictions of each arose concurrently with the growth
of the modern corporation, present insurance practices and the resulting
socio-political changes.8 Perhaps it would be enlightening to compare
them and speculate as to the future of the limitation doctrine now that
privity has been dealt several resounding death blows.

II.
A

CENTURY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY: FROM NO LIABILITY
TO STRICT LIABILITY

A defectively drafted declaration, with its main reliance on breach
of a special contract, led to Lord Abinger's famous dicta in Winterbottom
v. Wright9 that no recovery in tort could be had unless privity of contract existed.10
MAN,

7. For a survey of the Products liability area, see generally:
PRODUCTs

& FRIEDfor Injuries

FRUMER

LIABILITY (1964); Freezer, Manufacturer's Liability

Caused by His Products: Defective Automobiles, 37 MicH. L. Rzv. 1 (1938);
Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 DuQueSNE L. REv. 1
(1963) ; James, Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. REv. 192 (1955) ; Jeanblanc, Manufacturer's Liability to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv.
134 (1937); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consuiner), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
8. Historical matter taken from BRUCE, TriE SHAPING O THtE MODERN WORLD
699 (1958) and Annot., 164 A.L.R. 569, 584 (1946).
9. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 [Ex. 1841].
10. Id. at 114 "[I]f the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person
passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring

a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties

who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I
can see no limit, would ensue."
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The 1841 dicta of Winterbottom crossed the ocean to become the
basis of the 19th century general American rule" that contractors, manufacturers, or vendors were not liable to third parties for negligence in the
construction, manufacture, or sale of their articles. ". .

[A] wise and

conservative public policy has impressed the courts with the view that
there must be a fixed and definite limitation to the liability of manufacturers and vendors for negligence ....-12 Exceptions were condoned
only in certain invitee situations l 3 or if inherently dangerous instru4

mentalities were involved.1

As the 20th century dawned, the courts began to view the status of
manufacturing in a new light. The sheltered babe had grown into a
monopolistic giant and the courts attempted to aid the abused consumers
by expanding the definition of inherently dangerous instrumentalities.
The explosion of a carbonic acid gas cylinder in 190715 fell within the
inherently dangerous label, and later the explosion of a coffee urn cast
liability upon its manufacturer. 16 Finally, Justice Cardozo, in 1916, came
forth with his monumental decision' announcing the "modern rule"
that inherently dangerous articles need not be limited to poisons, explosives, and the like:
If the nature of the thing is such that it is reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing
of danger ....

If to the element of danger there is added knowledge

that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and
used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of the thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.
...Precedents drawn from the days
of travel by stagecoach do not
8
fit the conditions of travel today.'
The last thirty years have witnessed the birth of social legislation
in America, the phenomenal rise of insurance to become an integral
part of doing business and the complete maturation of marketing
11. National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 204 (1879); Bragdon v.
Perkins - Campbell Co., 87 Fed. 109 (3d Cir. 1898); Goodlander Mill Co. v.
Standard Oil Co., 63 Fed. 400, 406 (7th Cir. 1894).
12. Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865, 867 (8th Cir. 1903).
13. Roddy v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 234, 15 S.W. 1112 (1891) ; Coughtry
v. Globe Woolen Co., 56 N.Y. 124 (1874) ; Bright v. Barnett & Record Co., 60 N.W.
418, 420 (Wis. 1894).
14. The first items to be classified as dangerous instrumentalities were: poisonous
drugs, Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) ; tainted food and drink, Bishop v.
Weber, 139 Mass. 411, 1 N.E. 154 (1885); guns and other explosives, Landridge v.
Levy, 2 M. & W. 519 (1887) and Wellington v. Oil Co., 194 Mass. 64, 67 (1907).
"Health is too dear, and life too sweet, and consequences too great, to admit of either
carelessness or mistake in manufacture or fraud in inducing the sale of the same."
Hruska v. Parke, Davis & Co., 6 F.2d 536, 538 (8th Cir. 1925). However, lamps which
exploded, [Longmeid v. Holliday, 6 Exch. 761 (1852)], or cylinders of lubricating oil
which burst into flame, [Standard Oil Co. v. Murray, 119 Fed. 572 (7th Cir. 1902)],
were not included since they were not considered inherently dangerous.
15. Keep v. Nat'l Tube Co., 154 Fed. 121 (3d Cir. 1907).
16. Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063 (1909).
17. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
18. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
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analysis, adhesion contracts, and nationwide advertising. With the growth
of social consciousness and insurance protection, dismissals for lack
of privity decreased rapidly. Necessary component automobile parts
22
such as defective wheels, 19 brakes, 20 steering 2' and other equipment,
both electrical and mechanical, that could quickly maim if defective easily
came within the MacPhersonrule. However, seemingly innocuous items, including truck door handles, 23 ordinary beds, 24 lounge chairs, 25 mattresses, 26
and refrigerators, 2 7 at first rejected according to the MacPherson test,
eventually came before other courts who refused to follow precedent.28
Finally, most commentators and courts came to realize that the exceptions
had engulfed the general rule.
In other words, under the modern law, where the manufacturer
is held not liable for negligence, he is excused from liability on
doctrines of the law of torts; lack of foreseeability, want of actual
negligence, or the fact that the injury was not proximately caused
by his conduct, is the true basis of nonliability. The manufacturer
is not excused under the modern law merely because there happened
to be a lack of any privity of contract between him and the injured
person; such an artificial and anachronistic basis for relief from
tort liability can no longer, in the final analysis, be asserted. 29
The necessity of privity, even in warranty actions, received its
ultimate death blow from the Henningsen case. 0 The New Jersey Supreme
Court held that in this age of nationwide advertising and universal form
contracts privity must be abolished. Since the real contract is between
manufacturer and consumer, requiring circuitous litigation is unfair
to courts and plaintiffs alike. Thus, privity is considered dead by most
writers, and if courts ever impose strict liability upon manufacturers in
all situations, products liability will be a matter of historical interest
only.
19. Supra note 17.
20. Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App. Div. 433, 153 N.Y. Supp. 131 (1915).
21. Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1930).
22. Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P.2d 723 (1940);
Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y 468 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950) ; Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 253 Wis. 558, 34 N.W.2d A53 (1948).
23. Cohen v. Brockway Motor Truck Corp., 240 App. Div. 18, 268 N.Y. Supp.
545 (1934).
24. Isbell v. Biederman Furniture Co., 115 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. App. 1938) ; Field v.
Empire Case Goods Co., 179 App. Div. 253, 166 N.Y. Supp. 509 (1917).
25. Liedeker v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 249 App. Div. 835, 292 N.Y. Supp. 541,
aff'd 274 N.Y. 631, 10 N.E.2d 586 (1937).
26. Jaroniec v. C. 0. Hasselbarth, Inc., 223 App. Div. 182, 228 N.Y. Supp.
302 (1928).
27. Tayer v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 119 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. App. 1937).
28. Miles v. Chrysler Corp., 238 Ala. 359, 191 So. 245 (1939) (door handle);
Maecherlein v. Scaly Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d 331 (1956)
(mattress) ; Phillips v. Ogle Alum Furniture, 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857 (1951)
(kitchen chair) ; Beadles v. Servel, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951).
29. Annot., 164 A.L.R. 569, 592 (1946).
30. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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III.

LIMITATION -

A

HALF CENTURY OF GROWTH; A QUARTER CENTURY OF

FLUCTUATION; A QUARTER CENTURY OF DECLINE

3
While the privity principle espoused by Winterbottom v. Wright '
was crossing the ocean to the American shore, and the first great
American merchant marine was on the rise, Congress, with very little
debate, passed the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851.32 Its express
purpose was to bring the domestic law into harmony with that of
England and thus encourage investment in the American shipping
industry. 8 Typical statements made while the bill was under discussion
include:

I desire to call the attention of the Senate to a single point this bill is predicated on what is now the English law, and it is
deemed advisable by the Committee on Commerce that the American
marine 4should stand at home and abroad as well as the English
marine.8
the ocean as many induceWhy not give to those who navigate
5
ments to do so as England has done.
The Act was aimed primarily at protecting the property of the large
cargo shippers and only incidentally at protecting passengers and seamen. However, in time, the latter claims began to approximate and, in
some cases, even surpass the former. The Act (1) declared the general
principle of limited liability, (2) mentioned specifically the method of
surrender to the trustee, (3) referred vaguely to "appropriate proceedings"
and (4) afforded relief to owners of all vessels except those used in
rivers or inland navigation.3 6 It was sufficiently broad to provide the
courts with a basis for a half century of tremendous growth.
A. A Half Century of Growth
While Winterbottom v. Wright3 7 was being cited in dismissing
American product liability cases, another Wright decision, Norwich Co.
v. Wright, 8 coincidentally happened to be the first limitation problem
to reach the Supreme Court. That case involved a collision on Long
31. Supra note 9.
32. GILMoRo & BLACK, TH4 LAW or ADMIRALTY 664 (1957).
33. Castles, The Personal Contract Doctrine: An Anomaly in American Maritime Law, 62 YAiL. L.J. 1031 (1953).
34. Statement by Senator Hamlin, of Maine, Chairman of the Committee on
Commerce of the Senate, January 25, 1851 23 CONG. GLOBn 331-32, 31st Cong., 2d
Sess. (Jan. 25, 1851).

35. Ibid.
36. 3 B4NADicT,

AD~mALTY

337 (6th ed. 1940).

37. Supra note 9.
38. 80 U.S. 104 (1871).
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Island Sound in which the owners of the non-negligent vessel invoked
the Limitation Act and relief was summarily granted.
During this period, the courts, in light of the origin and purpose of
the Act generally construed it liberally so as to favor the shipowner.
Benedict states 39 that the judges, in their zealous opinions, emphasized
the purposes of this legislation "to promote the building of ships, and to encourage persons engaged in the business of navigation" 40 to put "American
shipping upon an equality with that of other maritime nations ' 41 and "to
encourage investment by exempting the investor from loss in excess of
the fund he is willing to risk in the enterprise." 42 These same courts, however, before the century had come to a close, had made the American
Limitation Act far more protective than its emulated English parent.
In 1872 the Supreme Court assigned exclusive jurisdiction to the
Federal Admiralty courts in limitation actions, 43 thereby confining seamen
and cargo owners to non-jury tribunals. Eight years later, in 1880, the
Supreme Court held, in The Benefactor,4 4 that a shipowner could postpone filing his petition for limitation until after the final judgment or
decree had been taken against him or his ship. 45 The Court went on to
say that perhaps limitation is never precluded "so long as any damage
or loss remains unpaid." 46 Following such a line of analysis, one could
project that not only were seamen and cargo-owners limited in their
recovery, but they could possibly be forced to wait and bargain until laches
set in or the shipowner filed his petition. Even if the shipowner filed
immediately following the entry of judgment, he would still have retained full beneficial use of the money owed for the four or five year
period of trial and appeal.
The following year saw The Scotland47 finally settle the issue of
interest determination in favor of the shipowner. Contrary to the
supposedly imitated laws of England, (which determined the value of the
vessel for limitation purposes as of the moment immediately preceding
the collision) the American courts restricted liability to whatever value
a ship might have at the termination of the voyage "after the effects
of the collision were fully developed. ' 48 Under such analysis, a sunken
ship might have a value of zero.
In Place v. Norwich & New York Transp. Co.,49 decided in 1886, it
was held that insurance was not "an interest in the vessel" and thus need
not be turned over in the limitation action. It was likened to a personal
39. Benedict, supra note 36 at 334.
40. Moore v. American Transp. Co., 65 U.S. 1, 39 (1860).
41. The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122, 128 (1894).
42. Flink v. Paladini, 279 U.S. 59 (1929).
43. General Admiralty Rules Nos. 54, 55, 56 and 57 of May 6, 1872.
44. 103 U.S. 239 (1880).
45. Id. at 244.
46. Id. at 250.
47. 105 U.S.24 (1881).
48. The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 490 (1885).
49. Ibid.
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collateral contract - a guarantee against loss, but conferring no interest
in property. When confronted with the hardship involved in the case,
the shipowner being fully indemnified and those suffering loss due to
his employees' fault obtaining nothing, the court remarked:
If the shipowner is indemnified against loss, it is because he has
seen fit to provide himself with insurance. The parties suffering loss
from the collision could, if they chose, protect themselves in the
same way. .

.

. The truth is, that the whole question, after all,

comes back to this: Whether a limited liability of shipowners is
consonant to public policy or not. Congress has declared that it is,
and they, and not we, are the judges of that question. 50
In so holding, the Court again went beyond the limitation law of England
in an effort to protect the shipping interests. The Court did not seem
to consider, however, that even though the cargo owner might be able
to afford sufficient insurance to cover his loss, the injured seaman might
not be in the same position.
Finally, Congress, in legislation of 1884 and 1886, rounded out the
shipowner's protection by (1) extending the right to limit to "all claims"
except seaman's wages and (2) abolishing the restrictions as to inland
vessels.5 1 This was the heyday of the shipping industry. Every shipowner
could now limit nearly all liability arising out of tort or contract.
Sailing was to remain smooth for the next quarter of a century, but a
distant change was in the wind.
B. A Quarter Century of Fluctuation
Exceptions oftentimes foreshadow the death of a judicial decision
or legislative decree. As the public policy that motivated a particular
act or decision changes, policy exceptions are inevitably made. At first
these exceptions appear slight and barely noticeable, but eventually they
snowball to such size and proportions as to completely engulf the general
rule. This evolution is clearly evident in the development of the "inherently dangerous" exception. Exceptions to the Limitation Act followed
a similar progression. In addition to the requirement of the absence
of "privity or knowledge" incorporated in the Act, another exception
commanded "that even though the loss is incurred without the shipowner's
'privity or knowledge,' limitation of liability will not be allowed if (1)
the shipowner's liability is based on a contract and (2) that contract
is personal."52 The Supreme Court, while expanding limitation into the
non-maritime tort area in 1911, 53 indicated that it had already accepted and

approved the existence of the contract exception.
Thus construed, the section [i.e. § 189] harmonizes with the policy
of limiting the owner's risk to his interest in the ship in respect
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 495.
Supra note 36 at 338.
CASTLES,

supra note 33 at 1032.

Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911).
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of all claims arising out of the conduct of the master and crew,
whether the liability be strictly maritime or from a tort non-mari54
time, but leaves him liable for his own fault, neglect, and contracts.
[Emphasis added.]
Though citing no specific cases, the Court apparently had in mind the
several district and circuit court decisions 55 that held contracts for supplies and repairs in the home port to be "personal" and thus outside
limitation. The courts enunciated the "making" criteria to determine
what contracts should be considered "personal." If the contract had
been executed by the owner personally, as distinguished from one imputed
to him by law, it was deemed personal and thus not subject to limitation.
The present supply claims were furnished . . . upon the personal

contract of the owners. The act of 1884 limiting the liability of the
owners of a vessel on account of the same, does not, I think, restrict
the liability of owners upon their own personal contracts, but only
their liability 'on account of the vessel;' that is, the liability that
is imposed on them by law in consequence of their ownership of the
vessel, viz., for the contracts or acts of the ship, or her master, without the owner's express intervention.5"
Following the "personal contract" theory laid down in the original
repair and supply cases, the Supreme Court, in 1918, had no difficulty
including the charter party as a "personal contract. '5 7 The Court stated
that "[t]he contract was between human beings and the petitioner by
his own act knowingly made himself a party to an express undertaking
for the seaworthiness of the ship.""" Whether the owners best efforts
were expended to make the vessel seaworthy was not considered a material
question since the action was in warranty.
A year later, Judge Learned Hand, sitting on the New York District
Court, attempted to restrict the growth of the "personal contract" exception.5 9 He stated that the person making the contract was of little
significance, but rather, one should look to the owner's relationship to
the breach. If he were in privity or had warranted against the breach,
then only should he be found liable. The Supreme Court, in 1932, likewise refused to expand the charter party decisions of 1918 and 1919.
Taking the same "making" approach that had been promulgated in the
initial supply and charter party holdings, the Court declared that bills
of lading were not personal contracts 0 because not executed by the
54. Id. at 106.
55. Great Lakes Towing Co. v. Mill Transp. Co., 155 Fed. 11 (6th Cir. 1907);
The Amos D. Carver, 35 Fed. 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1888); The Mary Morgan, 28 Fed. 196
(E.D. Pa. 1886).
56. The Amos D. Carver, 35 Fed. 665, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1888).
57. Luckenbach v. W. J. McCahan Sugar Refining Co., 248 U.S. 139 (1918);
Pendleton v. Benner Line, 246 U.S. 353 (1918).
58. Pendleton, supra, note 57.
59. The Soerstad, 257 Fed. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
60. Earle & Stoddart, Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, Ltd., 287 U.S. 420 (1932).
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shipowner or any of his officers or managers. Rather, they are given
by agents of various railroads or other steamship companies and thus
should be regarded as merely "ship's documents." 61 This decision was
certainly in line with previous personal contract history. The "making"
rule was not satisfied for the reasons stated above, and the "breach"
rule was not applicable because there was nothing resembling warranty.
In fact, all the bills of lading contained an express disclaimer of liability.
This universally utilized disclaimer was later adopted by the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act of 1936.62 It seems that cargo owners could not
arouse sufficient sympathy in the courts or the public to induce expansion
of the personal contract exception. Perhaps this was because their
position had so little appeal. They were universally covered by insurance;
thus, litigation simply pitted one insurance company against another.
In addition, they had expressly consented to the liability disclaimer
present in every bill of lading.
C. The Quarter Century of Decline
The Roosevelt years, seated in 'the depths of depression, witnessed
an abrupt change in the political climate. While Congress was passing
social legislation and the National Labor Relations Act and the courts
were expanding the "inherently dangerous" exception to its outer limits,
these same organs of power were making inroads into the Limitation Act
and the previous protection afforded the shipowner. Subsidies had become a more common method of aiding favored industries, and seamen,
not shipowners, were the favored darlings of the day.
The first case 63 of this era saw the Supreme Court limit the effect of
General Admiralty Rules Nos. 54, 55, 56, and 57 of May 6, 1872, which
had assigned exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Admiralty Courts, by
deciding that a single claimant should be allowed to proceed with a trial
on the merits of his own case in the forum of his choice. Only the right
to limit and the question of value should be heard in the admiralty court.
Thus, the injured seaman might now have an opportunity to present his
case before a jury.
The Legislature, not to be outdone in aiding the "small man," passed
several amendments to section 183 of the Act. The first of these required
the shipowner, who was found liable but entitled to limitation, to supplement the fund available for loss of life and bodily injury to $60 per
ton of the vessel's tonnage.6 4 Thus, a sunk vessel no longer totally
eliminated the shipowner's liability. The seaman's plight had finally
come to the attention of Congress.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 429.
49 Stat. 1211 (1936), 46 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (1958).
Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931).
49 Stat. 1479 (1958), 46 U.S.C.A. § 183(b) (1958).
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In 1936, The Benefactor 65 was legislatively overruled by subsection
(b) of section 183.06 Filing the limitation petition now was required
within six months after the claim and could no longer be delayed until after
'67
entry of judgment or "so long as any damage or loss remains unpaid.
6
8
Place v. Norwich, which had declared that insurance was not a
part of the owner's interest and thus need not be surrendered, was impaired by the 4-4-1 decision in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing.69 The
dissent in that case stated that collision insurance, unlike hull insurance,
is expressly acquired for the benefit of injured claimants. To deny them
recovery would only aid insurance companies; certainly not one of the
70
express purposes for passing the Limitation Act.
Judicial expansion of the Limited Liability Act at this date seems
especially inappropriate. Many of the conditions in the shipping
industry which induced the 1851 Congress to pass the Act no longer
prevail. And later Congresses, when they wished to aid shipping,
provided subsidies paid out of the
public treasury rather than
71
subsidies paid by injured persons.
In 1955, the next of kin of deceased seamen, whose fishing ship had
capsized at sea, sought to expand the doctrine of personal contract to a
previously unthinkable degree. They alleged that seamen's claims, based on
unseaworthiness, are not subject to limitation because contractual in nature
and personal to the owner. They cited the line of charter cases that held
the express or implied warranty of seaworthiness to be personal to the
owner and not subject to limitation. The court held:
These cases are based on a theory of warranty implied in fact and
recognize the right of the charterer to expressly disclaim such a
warranty. But, the owner's liability to seamen for failure to supply
a seaworthy vessel flows from an obligation imposed by7 2law which
is absolute, non-delegable, and not subject to disclaimer.
Thus, the test expressed by the Second Circuit was whether the contracting party voluntarily assumed the obligations or whether the liability
was imposed by law as an essential element of the owner and seaman
relationship.
Four years later, the Second Circuit also decided that if the fulfillment of a contract required the use of several vessels and fire arose
upon one of these vessels, all of the vessels had to be surrendered before
liability could be limited.7 3 The particular fact situation involved a
dredging operation in which several tugboats and a number of barges
65. Supra note 44.
66. 49 Stat. 1479 (1958), 46 U.S.C.A. § 183(b) (1958).
67. 103 U.S. 239 at 250.
68. Supra note 48.
69. 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
70. Id. at 436.
71. 347 U.S. 409, at 437.
72. Petition of Wood,230 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1956).
73. In re United States Dredging Corp., 264 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1959).
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were being utilized. Specific contractual situations that would demand
the use of an entire fleet could be imagined. Would they all have to be
surrendered to pay for the injuries of an injured seaman? This case
could serve as precedent for such a holding.
The most clearly "extraordinary" case to arise recently in this area
is Murray v. New York Central R.R., 74 which held maintenance and
cure, arising out of employment, sufficiently contractual to be excluded
from limitation. This case runs directly contrary to all "personal contract" precedent.
The first question is whether maintenance and cure is contractual.
Miller v. Standard Oil75 held that the employer-employee relationship
may be contractual, but the right founded upon maintenance and cure is
not founded upon a "meeting of the minds." It is inexorably attached by
ancient and established maritime law to every seaman's contract of
employment. De Zon v. American PresidentialLines"' stated that when
a seaman joins ship, the maritime law annexes a duty that no private
agreement is competent to abrogate. Hazelton v. Luckenbach"7 added
that the obligation to provide maintenance and cure is independent of
fault: an absolute liability. Hunt v. Trawler Brighton, Inc.7 s and The
Cliftwood70 held that the right of the seaman to recover maintenance and
cure is not dependent upon his signing articles [his employment contract].
In The Cliftwood, though the seaman could not recover his wages
absent a contract of employment, he did recover maintenance and
cure.
Assuming, arguendo, that maintenance and cure is contractual, is it
personal? The "making" rule certainly indicates otherwise. The ship's
agent or the master ususally enters into the employment contracts, and no
one could rationally consider an owner's personal intervention. His sole
basis for liability is thus as the owner of the ship. There is no personal
reliance upon his credit such as existed in the early supply cases and
no personal contract such as appeared in the charter party cases.
Following the "breach" approach of Learned Hand, it is clear that
the owner personally makes no express warranty of his fulfillment of
maintenance and cure. As mentioned before, maintenance and cure attaches
as soon as a seaman joins ship, and sometimes may attach before or
continue after his departure. The shipowner cannot disclaim it, and he
certainly does not voluntarily warrant it.
Petition of Hutchinson,s0 the case nearest the issue, involved an
explosion on board a yacht resulting in injury to the plaintiff, a seaman.
Sometime later, the shipowner promised the hospital that he would
74. 171 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 287 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1961).
75. 199 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1952).
76. 318 U.S. 660 (1943).
77. 134 F. Supp. 525 (D. Mass. 1955).
78. 102 F. Supp. 300 (D. Mass. 1952).
79. 280 Fed. 726 (D. Ala. 1922).
80. 28 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
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personally assume the debts of the injured persons. This was construed
as a personal contract since made by the shipowner directly, as distinguished from one imputed to him by law from his relationship to the
vessel. Comparing this case with Murray, the extent of the Second
Circuit decision becomes apparent.
A final reason rendering the Murray decision "extraordinary" is
that only six years previously the same court had dismissed the idea that
seaworthiness may be personal to the owner and exempt from limitation.
All the arguments that seaworthiness is an obligation imposed by law
absolute, non-delegable, and not subject to disclaimer - could be
equally applied to maintenance and cure. If the implied warranty of
seaworthiness is not personal, neither is maintenance and cure.
Considering the decisions in retrospect, a semblance, at least, of a
current position presents itself. A limitation action today is not entirely
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty courts.8' The shipowner has only six months (subject to some discretion, as evidenced
by several cases) to file his petition for limitation if he intends it
to be effective.8 2 The Scotland83 case, which settled the time for interest
determination as the period following the accident "after the effects of the
collision were fully developed" still seems to be good law but the question
of insurance interest is beginning to receive opposition.8 4 Limitation still
extends to most vessels and as of 1911 to non-maritime torts.8 5 A fund
for bodily injury and death must amount to at least $60 per ton. 6
The home port doctrine has died,87 but the recognition of supply cases
as personal contracts still seems to live on. Charter party situations are
definitely included a8 and bills of lading strictly excluded 9 from the
"personal contract" doctrine. Also, limitation today may demand the
forfeiture of several ships"0 if necessarily utilized and required by a
particular contract. Finally, though the implied warranty of seaworthiness
has been excluded from the "personal contract" 91 area, maintenance
92
and cure has somehow forced its way in.
Projecting into the future in light of Murray and the recently
decided Petition of Oscar Tiedemann,93 maintenance and cure can be
81. Supra note 62.
82. Supra note 65.
83. Supra note 47.
84. Supra note 78.
85. Supra note 53.
86. Supra note 63.
87. GILMORE & BLACK, THs LAW o ADMIRALTY 708 (1957).
88. Supra note 57.
89. Supra note 60.
90. Supra note 72.
91. Supra note 71.
92. Murray v. New York Central R.R., 171 F. Supp. 80, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
93. Petition of Oscar Tiedemann & Co., 236 F. Supp. 895 (D. Del. 1964). Judge
Layton differed from Judge Murphy's personal contract approach by asserting that
the inclusion of maintenance and cure within the Limitation Act was not a part of
the Legislative intent. No Congressional report was cited and concededly none exists.
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seen as acquiring a new importance in limitation actions. Until recently.
the main thrust of the injured seaman's claim has been in the nature of
Jones Act negligence9 4 and unseaworthiness.9 5 Much larger recoveries
can usually be obtained in such proceedings,9 6 and the element of maintenance and cure is included in the verdict. However, both negligence and
unseaworthiness are subject to limitation and if the fund created is
insufficient to meet the claims of the dead and injured (as it usually is)
the seaman is restricted to his proportionate share. But if Murray and
Oscar Tiedemann continue to prevail the seaman can go beyond the
limitation fund to acquire an amount necessary for his maintenance and
cure. If the commissioner then grants fairly large sums, as was done
in Oscar Tiedemann (some verdicts were as high as $40,000), the
Limitation Act is smartly circumvented and the shipowner is saddled with
a new liability for which he was unprepared. The total maintenance
and cure liability in Oscar Tiedemann was in excess of $160,000; a sum
nearly equal to the limitation fund itself and not at all covered by
insurance. Thus, a new liability maneuver was born and the shipowner
was the unwary victim. The 19th century shipowner's stronghold, beseiged
by the Jones Act in 1915 and 192097 and by the doctrine of unseaworthiness
in the 40's and 50's,98 is now being assailed by maintenance and cure.9 9
In the course of a century, the wheel of history has made a full turn;
the victimized becoming the ward and the darling the prey.
Richard C. Angino
The public policy at the time was entirely directed to the benefit of the shipower, as
shown in the earlier part of the paper, and the seaman's claims were intended to be
limited as well as the cargo owner's. See text quote to note 50.
94. In Section 33 of the Marine Act of 1920, Congress amended Section 20 of the
Act of 1915 to read as follows:
Any seaman, who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment

may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of
trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or
extending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway
employees shall apply; . . . 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (1958).
95. The vessel and, owner are, both by English and American law, liable to an
indemnity for injuries received by a seaman in consequence of the unseaworthiness
of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship. Scarff v. Metcalf, 107 N.Y. 211 (1887).
96. The amount recoverable under maintenance and cure is limited to the sum
necessary to maintain the person while he is sick or injured and the required costs
of his intended cure. Damages for loss of future earning power and permanent injury
are not recoverable.
97. Supra note 93.
98. "Until the mid 1940's the seaman's right to recover damages for injuries caused
by the unseaworthiness of the ship was an obscure and relatively little used remedy....
Today the unseaworthiness doctrine has become the principal vehicle for personal
injury recovery." GUmoF4 & BLACK, THt LAW Oit ADMIRALTY 315 (1957).
99. Of course, the shipowner can insure against this liability, as he has insured
against negligence and unseaworthiness. However, the statutes and the courts are
now heavily weighted in favor of the seaman and against the shipowner and this
hand-on-the-scale practice seems to be destined to put an end to American shipping.
Competition from domestic air carriers and foreign shipping (which benefits from
lower wage scales and favorable tax treatment) have stunted development and
precipitated a severe decline. The disfavor exhibited by the courts and government
seems destined to kill American shipping just as quickly as previous favor gave it life.
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